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Note 
Same-Sex Marriage and Disestablishing 
Parentage: Reconceptualizing Legal Parenthood 
Through Surrogacy 
 
Michael S. DePrince* 
Recently married, Anne and Andrew decide they want to 
have their first child. After multiple failed attempts, the couple 
learns that Andrew has a low sperm count, rendering him func-
tionally infertile. Desiring a child that is genetically related to 
at least one of them, Anne and Andrew pursue alternative bio-
logical reproduction in lieu of adoption. They obtain sperm from 
an anonymous donor and Anne undergoes artificial insemina-
tion, resulting in a viable pregnancy. Shortly before the child‘s 
birth, however, the couple files for divorce. At this time, An-
drew maintains that he is not the child‘s genetic father and, 
consequently, should not be responsible for the child upon the 
dissolution of the marriage. To the contrary, Anne indicates 
that notwithstanding biology, Andrew is equally the child‘s le-
gal parent. Can Andrew successfully disestablish his 
parenthood?  
Now, entertain instead an alternative iteration of the 
above factual scenario: Anne and Andrew are Bill and Andrew. 
Bill and Andrew, a married couple, decide to have a child. Be-
cause the couple is structurally infertile, they obtain an egg 
from an anonymous donor. The couple uses Bill‘s sperm to cre-
ate a viable embryo and subsequently implants the embryo into 
the womb of a third-party gestational carrier. Shortly before 
the child‘s birth, however, the couple files for divorce. Can An-
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love, support, and encouragement, without which nothing would be possible. 
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drew, being genetically unrelated to the child, disestablish his 
legal fatherhood? Does the answer differ because Bill and An-
drew are not Anne and Andrew? What if they were Anne and 
Barbara instead?  
Parenthood is quite easily determined when a married 
couple conceives a child through sexual reproduction. ―The bio-
logical mother and father are the child‘s legal parents, and 
marriage unites them in an enterprise of lifelong duration.‖1 
However, family law has undergone dramatic changes in recent 
decades,2 and the deviation from this historic unification of sex, 
reproduction, and marriage yields inherent uncertainty under-
lying the above scenarios. Today, the definition of parentage, 
and in turn ―the determination of which adults receive legal 
recognition in children‘s lives,‖ represents one of modern family 
law‘s most contentious issues: ―Not only are jurisdictions irrec-
oncilably divided in their approach to parentage, decisions un-
der settled law in a given county may not necessarily come out 
the same way.‖3 
Same-sex couples are uniquely situated in this family law 
transformation—not only through the advent of same-sex mar-
riage, but also because they cannot procreate through sexual 
intercourse. Unprecedented advances in technology have in-
creased the frequency of conception through assisted reproduc-
tive techniques4—and more specifically, surrogacy: when a 
woman carries and births a child for its intended parents.5 In 
turn, surrogacy has increased the complexity of determining 
parenthood, and parentage laws have not kept pace with this 
technology.6 Much akin to the fractured same-sex marriage 
 
 1. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Par-
ent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1011, 1017 (2003) [hereinafter Which Ties Bind?]. 
 2. See infra Part I.A.2. See generally Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s 
Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. 
VA. L. REV. 547, 548–50 (2000) (discussing the rise in children born to unmar-
ried mothers, the dissolution of marriages with children, and the weakening of 
the martial presumption of paternity). 
 3. June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the 
Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2005). 
 4. E.g., Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining 
Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 353, 353–54 
(2011). 
 5. A surrogate may or may not have a genetic relation to the child she 
carried based on the type of surrogacy undertaken: traditional or gestational. 
―What sets gestational surrogacy apart from traditional surrogacy is that the 
woman who bears the child is not genetically related to the child.‖ Id. at 362. 
 6. See id. 
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landscape prior to Obergefell v. Hodges,7 ―[n]o uniformity exists 
among states concerning the legal relationships established 
through collaborative reproduction.‖8 This uncertainty stems 
from the dissociation of sex and reproduction, which represents 
a paradigmatic shift in society‘s understanding of parentage. 
Same-sex assisted reproduction erodes the traditional mother-
father framework, as well as mother-father duality, by requir-
ing a third individual—not party to the marriage—to play an 
integral biological role in conception (albeit oftentimes with no 
intent to play a functional role as a parent). With more children 
conceived through alternative reproductive means and born in-
to same-sex marriages, determining parentage proves ―increas-
ingly problematic and ripe for growing caseloads.‖9 
Moreover, same-sex marriage yields same-sex divorce, a 
concept and practice still evolving in the United States.10 Tra-
ditional parentage frameworks were largely contested when di-
vorce rates spiked amongst the heterosexual population during 
the latter-twentieth century. Previously, husbands would not 
have inquired into their paternity at divorce, as no confirmato-
ry means then existed. Because the upsurge in divorce occurred 
at the same time as the advent of near-certain paternity test-
ing, however, an unprecedented wave of presumed fathers—
who thought (and held out) a child born during the marriage to 
be their own—sought to disestablish their parenthood by prov-
ing non-biological paternity at divorce.11 Thus, while advocates 
and academics stress the importance of clear legal frameworks 
 
 7. The Supreme Court decided the landmark marriage equality decision, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), during this Note‘s publication. 
Nonetheless, jurisdictional discord persists around collaborative reproduction 
and legal parentage. 
 8. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Past, Present and Future of the 
Marital Presumption, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 387, 
394 (Bill Atkin & Fareda Banda eds., 2013) [hereinafter The Past, Present and 
Future]. 
 9. Dana, supra note 4, at 357. 
 10. See generally Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: 
Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1679 (2011) 
(outlining the challenge same-sex couples faced in meeting jurisdictional-
based divorce residency requirements); Joseph William Singer, Same Sex 
Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 1, 13–14 (2005) (identifying the geographic limitations of same-sex 
divorce pre-Obergefell). 
 11. See infra Part I.A.2; see, e.g., Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Pa-
ternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 
261 (2006). 
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to establish same-sex parentage,12 its discussion within the 
context of a same-sex partner‘s attempt to disestablish 
parenthood proves equally pressing. As all states begin to rec-
ognize same-sex marriages, a subset of these marriages will not 
only inevitably result in same-sex divorce, but also the birth of 
children that will only be biologically related to, at most, one of 
their parents.13 
This Note explores the currently indeterminate legal status 
of intended same-sex parents who are party to a surrogacy ar-
rangement, with express concern regarding same-sex marriag-
es that dissolve while a child is still in the womb. Same-sex 
couples, like infertile heterosexual couples, are different from 
fertile heterosexual couples in that they must intend a preg-
nancy for it to occur. Same-sex couples must therefore arrange 
for the conception of a child with the involvement of a third-
party sperm donor, egg donor, and/or surrogate. This need for 
third-party involvement offers the opportunity to establish in-
tended parentage in writing, and same-sex couples can also ar-
range for the severance of the parental status of third-party 
participants. State law ultimately determines the timing of 
such severance, with some doing so at the time of conception 
and others after a child‘s birth. It is possible, however, that a 
same-sex couple could arrange for the severance of the parental 
status of other parties, yet be unable to establish the parental 
status of the intended same-sex parents—namely, the non-
biological partner—until after birth. In the period between the 
severance of the third party‘s parental status and the estab-
lishment of the intended parents‘ parental status, the marital 
relationship could end. At this time, the non-biological partner 
could attempt to disestablish any and all responsibility for the 
child, leaving the child with the support of only one of its in-
tended parents at birth. 
While the discussion focuses namely on the LGBT14 com-
munity, this Note acknowledges that the same uncertainties 
and resultant concerns can potentially arise with heterosexual 
 
 12. See Dana, supra note 4, at 373. 
 13. Cf. Tiffany L. Palmer, The Winding Road to the Two-Dad Family: Is-
sues Arising in Interstate Surrogacy for Gay Couples, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y 895, 916 (2011) (―There have been few reported cases of custody dis-
putes between gay male partners who have co-parented a child through surro-
gacy, as compared with cases involving lesbian couples [so] embroiled . . . .‖). 
 14. LGBT is an initialism referring to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender. 
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marriages that dissolve mid-surrogacy arrangement.15 Though 
states can deal with this scenario in a variety of ways, almost 
all states have used estoppel or intent to lock in an intended 
parent who participated in bringing about the conception of a 
child.16 Same-sex couples, however, are uniquely situated with-
in this family law quandary given the implicit heterosexism—
the implicit social, legislative, and judicial preference for chil-
dren having both a mother and a father17—that pervades social 
structures in the United States.18 Accordingly, this Note‘s pro-
posed solutions are drafted to enhance legal certainty for same-
sex couples procreating through surrogacy, but are also de-
signed to uniformly apply to the heterosexual population. 
Meaningful examination of this issue first requires an un-
derstanding of the basis for modern social perceptions of 
parenthood and their deficiencies as broadly applied to same-
sex couples choosing to procreate through alternative reproduc-
tive means. Part I examines the evolution of legal parenthood, 
the transformation of the American family unit, and the 
frameworks now employed in heterosexual contested parentage 
cases. Next, Part II posits that laterally applying current par-
entage frameworks to procreative same-sex parents unduly al-
lows a non-biological intended parent to disestablish future 
parenthood. In response, Part III proposes model surrogacy 
statutes, influenced by intent-based and labor-based parentage 
theories, which will better define the legal roles and responsi-
bilities—both pre-conception and pre-birth—of intended par-
ents and surrogates alike.  
 
 
 15. E.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(involving the legal parentage determination of a child conceived with donor 
egg and donor sperm and carried by a gestational surrogate whose intended 
parents‘ heterosexual marriage ended mid-pregnancy). 
 16. See Interview with June Carbone, Robina Chair in Law, Sci., & Tech., 
Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., in Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 6, 2015). 
 17. Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (―There is nothing 
in our culture or society that even begins to suggest a fundamental right on 
the part of the father to the custody of the child as part of his right to procre-
ate when opposed by the claim of the [natural] mother to the same child.‖), 
with A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 
2009) (granting parental rights to a same-sex couple‘s gestational carrier who 
had no genetic link to the children). 
 18. For a succinct overview of heterosexism and gender bias, see Dana, 
supra note 4, at 373–74. 
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I.  WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A PARENT: THEN AND NOW   
Discussion of disestablishing same-sex parentage is inex-
tricably linked to the foundational underpinnings of establish-
ing traditional parentage, still deeply rooted in American socie-
ty and law. To further illustrate the uncertainty around 
disestablishing same-sex parentage, this Part traces the evolu-
tion of family law and parentage. Section A describes the devel-
opment of the marital presumption and its subsequent weaken-
ing alongside the decline of the traditional family unit. Section 
B then explains the current jurisdictional split as to the pre-
sumption‘s application given new societal perceptions and val-
ues around the meaning of ―parentage.‖ Lastly, Section C in-
troduces the evolution of same-sex marriage, reproduction, and 
parenthood. 
A. DEFINING PARENTHOOD IN THE CONTEMPORARY UNITED  
STATES 
In the United States today, no express legal construct im-
poses a lifetime of ostracism and economic hardship on children 
born out of wedlock. Even so, modern conceptions of parentage 
display vestiges of early common law when such illegitimacy 
resulted in severe social stigma. Cognizing contemporary no-
tions of parenthood necessitates understanding not only its 
common law roots, but its swift evolution during the latter-
twentieth century. 
1. The Evolution of the Marital Presumption and the  
American Family Unit 
Influenced by Ancient Roman law, early English common 
law deemed a child born outside of marriage filius nullius: lit-
erally, no one‘s son.19 Such a framework yielded dire conse-
quences to bastard children. As the ―son of nobody,‖ bastardy 
subjected a child to discrimination ―in all realms of life,‖ and 
nullified the right to parental support—in turn severing the 
line of succession.20 Hence developed ―one of the most firmly-
 
 19. Glennon, supra note 2, at 553. 
 20. Id. at 563; see also Mikaela Shotwell, Note, Won’t Somebody Please 
Think of the Children?!: Why Iowa Must Extend the Marital Presumption to 
Children Born to Married, Same-Sex Couples, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
141, 143–44 (2012) (addressing the martial presumption as it applies to same-
sex couples and their children under Iowa law). 
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established and persuasive precepts known in law‖: the marital 
presumption of parenthood.21  
Under English common law, the marital presumption 
served a twofold function. When a child was born into a mar-
riage, the woman, having given birth as a function of biology, 
was presumed the child‘s mother; likewise, the woman‘s hus-
band, by virtue of marriage to the mother, was presumed the 
child‘s father.22 This effectively framed parenthood biologically, 
but during an era wherein genetic certainty lay only with the 
mother (as no method existed to confirm a father‘s genetic rela-
tion to a child).23 Nonetheless, a child‘s legitimacy filled ―socie-
ty‘s need for stability and certainty in family relationships.‖24 
The marital presumption thus restricted evidence ―that might 
disprove a husband‘s [biological] paternity . . . [and] call into 
question the child‘s identity and inheritance,‖ thereby limiting 
any post-birth inquiry around illegitimacy and rendering the 
presumption of parenthood virtually irrebuttable.25 
The marital presumption of parentage framework later 
crossed the Atlantic and was absorbed into early American 
law.26 This absorption effectively imbedded the marital pre-
sumption within the United States‘ sociocultural landscape, 
bolstering the cultural unification of sex, reproduction, and 
 
 21. Rhonda Wasserman, DOMA and the Happy Family: A Lesson in Irony, 
41 CAL. W. INT‘L L.J. 275, 280 (2010). 
 22. Id. at 279. 
 23. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 555. 
 24. Id. at 563. 
 25. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1019, 1050. But see id. at 1018 
(noting the presumption was not absolute, but administered so as to avoid in-
troducing facts at odds with irrefutability); cf. Glennon, supra note 2, at 562–
63 (―The mother and presumed father could only rebut that presumption by 
proving that the husband did not have access to his wife during the crucial pe-
riod of conception.‖). The presumption went beyond establishing and ensuring 
legitimacy, however: the doctrine also implicitly reinforced a sociocultural 
stigma attached to nonmarital sexual relations and childrearing. See Which 
Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1018. In buttressing marriage‘s societal function, 
the marital presumption created a system rooted in the number two, ―chan-
nel[ing] childrearing into two parent families and keep[ing] it there.‖ The Past, 
Present and Future, supra note 8, at 387. Indeed, most states still refuse to 
recognize more than two legal parents for a child. See, e.g., Ann E. Kinsey, 
Comment, A Modern King Solomon’s Dilemma: Why State Legislatures Should 
Give Courts the Discretion To Find that a Child Has More than Two Legal 
Parents, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 297–98 (2014). 
 26. And its vestiges still run deep in American family law. See, e.g., Lehr 
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (―[S]tate laws [still] almost universally 
express an appropriate preference for the formal family.‖).  
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childrearing.27 Marrying ―until death do us part‖ and establish-
ing a traditional household comprised of a husband, wife, and 
children became reinforced as an expected (and perhaps un-
questioned) trajectory for the majority of Americans.28 Indeed, 
this strong presumption applied in strict form in the United 
States through the mid-twentieth century.29 
Beginning in the 1960s, however, the United States experi-
enced revolutionary social change. The confluence of second-
wave feminism, sexual liberation, and the availability of birth 
control yielded an unprecedented transformation of sex, mar-
riage, and parenthood.30 With sex severed from marriage, more 
births occurred out of wedlock, unraveling the strong tether be-
tween marriage and parenthood.31 And as jurisdictions increas-
ingly recognized no-fault divorce, marriages dissolved at a 
staggering rate.32  
Thus, the prototypical traditional family unit, albeit ex-
pected in theory, proves exceptional in fact.33 Whereas 72% of 
American adults were married in 1960, this figure decreased to 
52% in 2008.34 Likewise, down from 40% in 1970, only 20% of 
 
 27. See Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1020.  
 28. See generally Brigid Schulte, Unlike in the 1950s, There Is No “Typi-
cal” U.S. Family Today, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2014/09/04/for-the-first-time-since-the-
1950s-there-is-no-typical-u-s-family (recognizing the predominance of the tra-
ditional breadwinner-homemaker families in the 1950s). 
 29. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 553–54. 
 30. See JANE F. GERHARD, DESIRING REVOLUTION: SECOND-WAVE FEMI-
NISM AND THE REWRITING OF AMERICAN SEXUAL THOUGHT, 1920 TO 1982, at 
1–50 (2001). 
 31. Between 1960 and 2008, the share of children born to unmarried 
mothers rose eightfold, from 5% to 41%. The Decline of Marriage and Rise of 
New Families, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 
2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/2. 
 32. During the same period, the share of American adults currently di-
vorced or separated increased from 5% to 14%. Id. 
 33. See Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between 
Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Par-
entage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 379, 381 (2007) (noting that the 
―model ‗traditional‘ family‖ is neither the norm nor the majority); cf. David D. 
Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biologi-
cal, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 132 (2006) 
(describing today‘s American domestic unit as a ―crazy quilt of one-parent 
households, blended families, singles, unmarried partnerships, and same-sex 
unions‖ (internal quotations omitted)). 
 34. The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, supra note 31. 
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American households today are comprised of married couples 
living with their own children.35 
2. Rebutting the Once-Irrebuttable Presumption: A Rise in  
Contested Parentage at Divorce 
Although illegitimacy once resulted in a life of social stig-
ma and economic deprivation, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the ―unfairness of punishing children for the circum-
stances of their conception.‖36 Though this benefits children 
born out of wedlock, this notion places children born into a dis-
solved marriage in a precarious position. With the social disad-
vantages of illegitimacy lessened, the strength of the marital 
presumption—designed to insulate society from the harms of 
bastardy—also has diminished in turn.37  
Given higher rates of divorce, both law and society increas-
ingly view former marital partners as ―independent persons 
who owe each other nothing after divorce.‖38 Similarly, based 
on the notion that ―a parent owes a duty of support only to his 
or her natural or legally adopted child,‖ a number of state 
courts hold that ―men who are presumed to be fathers through 
marriage may challenge their paternity at the time of di-
vorce.‖39 The net effect of a weaker presumption of parenthood, 
staggering divorce rates, and the advent of reliable paternity 
testing is a wave of presumed fathers—upon discovering they 
are not genetically related to at least one of their children—
seeking to rebut the marital presumption and disestablish their 
paternity.40  
The success of rebuttal varies with any given court‘s view 
of the marital presumption‘s underlying purpose. Challenges to 
the marital presumption are complex, resulting in a ―doctrinal 
 
 35. JONATHAN VESPA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA‘S FAMILIES 
AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 5 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/ 
p20-570.pdf. 
 36. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presump-
tion of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 243–44 
(2006). 
 37. See Singer, supra note 11, at 255. 
 38. Glennon, supra note 2, at 560. 
 39. Id. at 578. 
 40. See, e.g., NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178 (Va. Ct. App. 1989). See gener-
ally Tamar Lewin, In Genetic Testing for Paternity, Law Often Lags Behind 
Science, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/us/in 
-genetic-testing-for-paternity-law-often-lags-behind-science.html (―[T]he un-
seemly thing . . . is forcing a man . . . to assume financial responsibility for 
children . . . another man should be supporting.‖). 
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chaos‖ of ―dramatically different substantive and procedural 
law applied . . . in different states.‖41 For example, some juris-
dictions view the presumption as a marital safeguard, and in 
the event of divorce, there no longer exists a ―salvageable mar-
riage to preserve.‖42 Such courts permit divorce to end the mar-
ital presumption, allowing a father to overcome his presumed 
parenthood by confirming non-paternity through genetic test-
ing. In contrast, other courts ―are [not] as openly dismissive of 
the marital presumption,‖ instead viewing the presumption as 
protecting reasonable expectations.43 In such jurisdictions, eq-
uitable doctrines such as estoppel, laches, and the best inter-
ests of the child, are applied to prevent blanket disestablish-
ment of parentage, viz. rendering once-legitimate children 
illegitimate en masse.44  
In short, whereas the marital presumption once proved 
nearly ironclad,45 ―the destruction of the system that tied chil-
dren to two married parents,‖ coupled with sophisticated genet-
ic testing, effectively turned the presumption on its face.46 Con-
sequently, a new understanding of legal parentage has evolved 
alongside this starkly changing family landscape. 
B. FUNCTION, BIOLOGY, OR MARRIAGE? JURISDICTIONAL  
DISCORD OVER REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION 
Marriage is an institution in decline. Compared with earli-
er eras in which the majority of marriages did not end in di-
vorce and scientific knowledge did not enable near-certain ge-
 
 41. Glennon, supra note 2, at 566. 
 42. See Wasserman, supra note 21, at 282–83. See generally T.P.D. v. 
A.C.D., 981 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1999); Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609 (Md. 
2002); Williams v. Williams, 843 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 2003) (en banc); Doran v. 
Doran, 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
 43. Singer, supra note 11, at 257. 
 44. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 566; see also Wasserman, supra note 21, 
at 283 (discussing courts‘ best interest determinations). See generally 
Pedregon v. Pedregon, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861 (Ct. App. 2003); Ferguson v. Win-
ston, 996 P.2d 841 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000); S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174 S.W.3d 502 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 2005); J.C. v. J.S., 826 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super Ct. 2003). Indeed, the Uni-
form Parentage Act imposes an equitable bar such that no individual can chal-
lenge a presumed father‘s paternity more than two years after the child‘s 
birth. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2002). But cf. Glen-
non, supra note 2, at 570–71 (―Given the dramatic differences in judicial inter-
pretations . . . this provision is unlikely to create uniformity in . . . challenges 
to the paternity of presumed fathers.‖). 
 45. See Singer, supra note 11, at 248. 
 46. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1021–22 (noting this ―historically 
unprecedented issue‖). 
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netic testing, marriage today proves a less-secure standard for 
measuring parentage.47 The Supreme Court nonetheless upheld 
the presumption‘s constitutionality in the 1989 landmark plu-
rality decision Michael H. v. Gerald D.48 The extraordinary 
facts involved a child, Victoria, born into the marriage of Carole 
D. and Gerald D.49 Unbeknownst to Gerald, who was listed on 
the birth certificate, Victoria was the biological daughter of Mi-
chael H., the family‘s neighbor.50 Shortly after Victoria‘s birth, 
Carole informed Michael of his possible paternity.51 Within five 
months, Carole and Gerald separated, and Carole allowed Mi-
chael to establish a relationship with his daughter.52 But when 
Carole reconciled with Gerald, she severed the relationship be-
tween Michael and Victoria, and Michael sought to establish 
paternity and visitation rights.53 The Supreme Court ultimate-
ly affirmed California‘s ruling: Gerald‘s presumed paternity, 
stemming from his marriage to Carole at the time of Victoria‘s 
birth, barred conferring any parental rights to Michael, not-
withstanding his biological connection to and relationship with 
Victoria.54 
This outcome is significant in that the Court refused to 
hold the marital presumption unconstitutional in order to pro-
tect and preserve the ―integrity of the marital union.‖55 But 
more importantly, in upholding the constitutionality of the pre-
sumption, the Court did not require the marital presumption‘s 
use.56 Because Michael H. has not been overturned or success-
fully challenged, states are granted ―wide latitude in construct-
ing children‘s relationships to their parents.‖57  
―All states continue to recognise [sic] least a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a child born within marriage is the child of the 
husband . . . .‖58 But when parentage is contested, viz. a pre-
 
 47. Cf. June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Fami-
ly Law Fails in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 881 
(2011) [hereinafter Out of the Channel] (discussing the competing objectives of 
privileging marriage, biological paternity, and functional parenthood). 
 48. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 49. Id. at 113. 
 50. Id. at 113–14. 
 51. Id. at 114. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 115. 
 54. Id. at 131. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 129–30. 
 57. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1050. 
 58. The Past, Present and Future, supra note 8, at 390 (emphasis added). 
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sumed parent seeks disestablishment, many states have re-
shaped parentage laws to advance certain objectives in the 
modern family unit.59 In turn, marriage—though a valid 
benchmark when presuming legal parentage—does not serve as 
the exclusive factor for disestablishing parentage. Disestab-
lishment frameworks instead have evolved disparately amongst 
the states,60 yielding a clear jurisdictional split. While some 
states continue to back marriage as the determinative consid-
eration, other states look to a presumed parent‘s function or bi-
ology in adjudicating such parentage contests.61 
1. Assuming Responsibility: The Functional Approach 
In the realm of contested parentage, California represents 
the paradigmatic example of a state‘s judicial recognition of 
functional parenthood. The ―true test of [parent]hood‖ in Cali-
fornia is the ―actual caretaking‖ role and an ―investment in the 
relationship with the child.‖62 Two primary motivating factors 
toward this doctrinal shift include ―the conviction that two par-
ents are better than one, and the functional assumption that 
the responsibilities of parenthood are more important than bi-
ology or marriage.‖63 Within such a framework, the resolution 
of disputed parenthood is neither contingent upon establishing 
a genetic connection to the child, nor merely assigned through 
marriage to a biological parent.64 
This is not to say that biology and marriage are unim-
portant or inconsequential social roles. Indeed, each is recog-
nized as a foundational underpinning for establishing a parent-
 
 59. See Meyer, supra note 33, at 144 (noting the difficulty of balancing 
―respect for tradition‖ with the ―changing realities of the American family‖).  
 60. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 552 (highlighting this ―extraordinary 
lack of consistency‖). 
 61. See Out of the Channel, supra note 47; see also Melanie B. Jacobs, 
Overcoming the Marital Presumption, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 289, 289 (2012) (iden-
tifying the competing roles of biology, function, and intent in parentage de-
terminations). 
 62. Glennon, supra note 2, at 589. 
 63. June Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited: How Will Ideas of 
Partnership Influence the Emerging Definition of California Parenthood?, 7 
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 8 (2007); see also id. at 15 (noting a judi-
cial recognition of the emotional and financial stability derivative of the sup-
port of two parents). 
 64. Glennon, supra note 2, at 589; cf. Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for 
Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. 
REV. 611, 612 (2009) (―Functioning as a parent is considered, if at all, only 
when the primary issue is custody or access to a child.‖). 
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child relationship.65 But when an individual attempts to dises-
tablish parenthood, or two presumed fathers compete for par-
entage as in Michael H., California courts will not give undue 
weight to biology or marriage in its determination. Rather, the 
court will holistically weigh ―considerations of policy and logic 
in determining the most appropriate parent[s]‖ to continue in a 
child‘s life.66 
2. Genetic Ties Prevail: The Biological Approach 
―As biological certainty increases, and family forms multi-
ply, the genetic link has assumed greater importance.‖67 Texas, 
so aligned with this approach, utilizes biological relationships 
as a ―dominant basis‖ for settling parentage disputes.68 The 
impetus of such a policy decision is, in part, that biological par-
ents constitute the ―readiest source of support‖ when compared 
against a functional parent, for whom the legal status with and 
obligations to a child are comparatively uncertain (and poten-
tially transitory).69 This approach also signifies a judicial re-
sponse to Michael H., which prevented the biological parent 
from asserting parental rights over the non-biological parent.70  
A framework wherein biology prevails, though grounded in 
undisputed genetic certainty, produces unique (and incon-
sistent) results. For example, a parent, while raising a child as 
his own since birth, effectively becomes a ―third party to the 
child‖ in the event genetic testing establishes that he is not the 
biological father—with no biological ties to the child, a subse-
quent divorce would confer ―the right to simply walk away from 
parenting and child support.‖71 Moreover, a contested parent-
age dispute, such as in Michael H., would permit an unmarried 
biological father to establish legal parentage of a child born into 
a marriage ―over the objections of the mother‘s husband . . . 
even when that means extinguishing a substantial pre-existing 
 
 65. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 589. Under such a functional approach, 
marriage still serves as a presumption that a spouse has assumed a parental 
role, and biology still factors when there is no presumed second parent ful-
filling a child‘s need. 
 66. See Meyer, supra note 33, at 139 (internal quotations omitted); see, 
e.g., In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 937 (Cal. 2002). 
 67. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1024; see also Harris, supra note 64 
(―[B]iological parenthood is usually controlling when the issue is liability for 
child support.‖). 
 68. Glennon, supra note 2, at 588. 
 69. See Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1024–25. 
 70. E.g., In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994). 
 71. Glennon, supra note 2, at 588. 
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parent-child bond.‖72 
3. Marriage as Sacrosanct: The Marital Approach 
Lastly, some states such as Utah continue to treat 
parenthood and marriage as non-severable. Pursuant to this 
framework, contested parentage disputes are resolved not by 
holistically weighing who would best fulfill a parental role or 
who has established a biological relationship to the child; the 
individual married to the mother at the time of birth is favored 
regardless of the foregoing considerations.73 The primary goal 
underlying this clear preference is to preserve family integrity 
by distilling a child‘s best interests to birth within a marriage.74 
In other words, ―[t]he legal commitment of marriage to the 
child‘s mother would form the basis of the opportunity to par-
ent as well as the responsibility to do so.‖75 
A parent‘s ability to disestablish parentage upon establish-
ing non-paternity proves exceedingly difficult when parent-
child relationships are formed through a marriage.76 Indeed, in 
the event of a paternity dispute similar to Michael H., the goal 
of preserving the family unit will trump an unmarried biologi-
cal father‘s claim to a relationship with a biological child.77 Es-
tablishing a judicial commitment to preserving marriage neces-
sarily will ―foreclose[] the possibility of the child having a 
relationship with her or his biological and functional father . . . 
even if that is not a result that matches the child‘s best inter-
ests.‖78 
C. THE MODERN FAMILY LANDSCAPE: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND  
CO-PARENTAGE 
Since the 1960s, the United States has experienced a 
breakdown of the traditional family.79 But juxtaposed against 
this institutional decline is the rise of same-sex marriage, 
which has gained significant support and momentum.80 This 
 
 72. Meyer, supra note 33, at 138–39. 
 73. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 291. 
 74. Cf. Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1016 (―Some legislatures equate 
children‘s well-being with the existence of a two-parent family.‖). 
 75. Glennon, supra note 2, at 589 (emphasis added). 
 76. See, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 2008 UT 24, 182 P.3d 353, 354, 359. 
 77. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 291. 
 78. Id. at 290–91. 
 79. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
 80. Whereas in 2001, ―Americans opposed same-sex marriage by a 57% to 
35% margin,‖ 55% of Americans now ―support same-sex marriage, compared 
DEPRINCE_6fmt 1/3/2016 1:01 PM 
2015] RECONCEPTUALIZING PARENTHOOD 811 
 
unparalleled development has further altered traditional no-
tions around the American family and marriage landscapes. 
Before the Supreme Court decided Obergefell in June 2015,81 
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia had legalized 
same-sex marriage, with increasing numbers of children grow-
ing up within such unions.82  
When a state sanctions same-sex marriages, ―these new 
family units typically are deemed equal to, or the same as, 
longstanding opposite sex marriages.‖83 Though a portion of 
these children will be adopted, several will be born into a same-
sex marriage through productive means.84 However, two genet-
ic parents are required to conceive a child—one providing 
sperm and the other an ovum. Same-sex couples lack one of 
these biological components, meaning they necessarily cannot 
conceive their own biological children without third-party con-
tribution of the missing reproductive cell.85 Thus, because 
same-sex couples ―simply cannot themselves produce children 
through intrafamily [sic] intercourse, as can opposite sex cou-
ples,‖ ―equality and sameness are impossible.‖86 
In short, centuries of longstanding precepts of parenthood 
quickly evolved in response to paradigmatic shifts in family law 
during the twentieth century. With the emergence of same-sex 
marriage and extraordinary alternative avenues to biological 
reproduction, continued application of modern family law doc-
trine will be inadequate to meet the demands of contemporary 
families. As with the breakdown of the traditional family unit, 
 
with 39% who oppose it.‖ Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. 
(July 29, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/07/29/graphics-slideshow 
-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage. 
 81. The Supreme Court decreed nationwide marriage equality during this 
Note‘s publication. See supra note 7. 
 82. Of the approximately 783,100 same-sex households in the United 
States, 334,829 are now legally married. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS: 2014 (2014), http://www.census 
.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2014] (se-
lect link to ―XLSX‖ document to download and view). 
 83. Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, Procreative Sex and Same 
Sex Parents, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 591, 592 (2012). 
 84. Within the population of same-sex married couples, 12.1% live with 
their own biological children, and about 17.3% of all same-sex couples have 
children in their household. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2014, supra note 82. 
 85. Albeit beyond this Note‘s scope, the only conceivable exception is a 
transgendered individual who preserves her or his ova or sperm before transi-
tioning to the other gender and, subsequent to transition, utilizes assisted re-
productive technology to reproduce with a person of the same sex.  
 86. Parness & Townsend, supra note 83. 
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what it means to be a parent will require further social recon-
ceptualization.  
II.  LATERAL APPLICATION OF EXISTING PARENTAGE 
FRAMEWORKS FAIL PROCREATIVE SAME-SEX COUPLES 
AND THEIR CHILDREN   
The LGBT community has gained remarkable social ac-
ceptance in the United States.87 Notwithstanding the momen-
tum reshaping marriage laws across the country, ―the law still 
lags behind when it comes to protecting the family relation-
ships these individuals build . . . as the legal system has been 
slow to recognize families that do not fit the traditional hetero-
geneous structure.‖88 New technology creates extra uncertainty 
for LGBT family structures, for in lieu of adoption, ―many 
LGBT individuals and couples seek to build their families 
through [assisted reproductive technology (ART)], so that at 
least one partner in the relationship has a genetic relationship 
to the resulting child.‖89 
Given this dearth of legal certainty and protection, this 
Part posits that laterally applying current parentage frame-
works to procreative same-sex parents unduly allows a non-
biological intended parent to disestablish parenthood of a child 
still in utero. Section A explores why applying the marital pre-
sumption to instances of ART, albeit important, proves inade-
 
 87. Compare Bruce Drake, As More Americans Have Contacts with Gays 
and Lesbians, Social Acceptance Rises, PEW RES. CTR. (June 18, 2013), http:// 
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/18/as-more-americans-have-contacts 
-with-gays-and-lesbians-social-acceptance-rises (noting that ―68% of those who 
know a lot of gays and lesbians‖ say they support same-sex marriage), and 
Lydia Saad, U.S. Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian Relations Is the New Normal, 
GALLUP (May 14, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154634/acceptance-gay 
-lesbian-relations-new-normal.aspx (noting the increase in the percentage of 
American adults who consider gay and lesbian relations morally acceptable 
from 38% in 2002 to 56% in 2011), with Lila Shapiro, LGBT Americans Feel 
Growing Acceptance, Lingering Discrimination, Survey Finds, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 13, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/13/lgbt 
-americans-survey_n_3437253.html (describing a survey wherein 53% of 
LGBT adults said there continues to be a lot of discrimination against LGBT 
people), and Mackenzie Yang, LGBT Americans Feel More Accepted, but Still 
Claim Discrimination, TIME (June 13, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/ 
06/13/lgbt-americans-feel-more-accepted-but-still-claim-discrimination (listing 
the various ways in which LGBT adults have faced discrimination). 
 88. Dana, supra note 4, at 373. This is likely attributable, in part, to im-
plicit heterosexism: a generalized ―institutional discomfort‖ with recognizing 
two mothers or two fathers for a child, as well as ―judicial bias‖ reflecting a 
partiality toward heterosexual procreation. See id. at 353, 375. 
 89. Palmer, supra note 13, at 896.  
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quate. Section B analyzes how current disestablishment 
frameworks fail as applied to procreative methods of same-sex 
parents—specifically, surrogacy. Finally, Section C examines 
alternative parentage frameworks purported by scholars that 
will better support and define the legal status of same-sex par-
ents. This broad examination of the shortcomings of current 
contested parentage frameworks as applied to procreative 
same-sex couples will enable discussion around reconciling and 
resolving the indeterminate legal status of intended same-sex 
parents who are party to a surrogacy arrangement.  
A. APPLYING THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION IS INADEQUATE FOR  
SAME-SEX PARENTS 
With the rise of same-sex marriage, several states have be-
gun expanding the marital presumption to children born into 
same-sex marriages.90 This proves pivotal in achieving stability 
and legitimacy for these family units: ―To the extent that a 
generalized preference for two parents joined by a legal rela-
tionship explains the presumption,‖ applying the presumption 
to same-sex parents helps to realize this goal.91 The biological 
realities of same-sex procreation nonetheless frustrate lateral 
applicability of the marital presumption to surrogacy agree-
ments. 
Amongst heterosexual couples, pregnancy may occur acci-
dentally, and further still, may occur extramaritally. Absent 
confirmatory paternity testing, a husband may not even be 
aware of his potential non-paternity at the time of conception. 
Accordingly, the presumption exists to unify reproduction and 
childrearing to sex within the marriage—in turn creating legal 
parenthood in the father by presuming a child‘s biological legit-
imacy.92 Though childbirth once resulted exclusively from het-
erosexual intercourse, modern technology facilitates reproduc-
tion notwithstanding functional and structural infertility.93 
 
 90. See The Past, Present and Future, supra note 8, at 397. 
 91. Appleton, supra note 36, at 245. ―Indeed, gay marriage advocates of-
ten invoke protection of the relationship between a child and both of her same-
sex parents as a reason for allowing same-sex couples to marry.‖ Nancy D. Pol-
ikoff, A Mother Should Not Have To Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for 
Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 201, 247 (2009). 
 92. See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and 
Fathers, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 662 (2014) (―Historically, the marital pre-
sumption codified an assumed biological link.‖); see also supra notes 19–35 and 
accompanying text. 
 93. Functional infertility occurs when an individual cannot reproduce 
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Consequently, lesbian and gay couples—though structurally in-
fertile—can utilize various assisted reproductive techniques to 
procreate.94  
As a result, ―same-sex couples do not conceive children by 
accident.‖95 For lesbian couples, ―both women know from the 
moment of pregnancy that the partner is not the child‘s biologi-
cal parent.‖96 Likewise for gay couples, only one of the men can 
fertilize the egg to be utilized in surrogacy. When same-sex 
couples procreate biologically, this not only circumvents sex 
within the marriage, but also necessarily inhibits biological 
connection for at least one intended parent from the outset.97 
The inherent impossibility of genetic relation to at least one in-
tended parent contravenes the underlying purpose of the mari-
tal presumption, rendering its application to same-sex couples 
a biological fallacy.98 
 
with her or his partner for medical reasons, such as unviable ova or sperm, 
whereas structural infertility ―applies to the situation of individuals who are 
single or those who have a partner of the same sex, and therefore require an-
other party‘s biological assistance to reproduce.‖ Dana, supra note 4, at 359. 
 94. For lesbian same-sex couples, each partner possesses not only ova, but 
also a womb. As a result, ―artificial insemination-based arrangements, where 
one partner is inseminated with donor sperm and the biological mother and 
her partner co-parent the child, are often feasible and inexpensive.‖ Palmer, 
supra note 13, at 898. Nonetheless, to ensure a physical connection between 
the child and each partner, lesbians may elect in vitro fertilization, removing 
ova from one partner (the biological mother), inseminating them with donor 
sperm, and implanting them in the other partner (the gestational mother). 
See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675–76 (Cal. 2005). Lesbian couples ac-
cordingly need not turn to surrogacy to conceive a child. But in the event nei-
ther partner can carry a child to term the couple may seek donor sperm and 
contract for a surrogate. In contrast, ―[g]ay male couples face an obvious prob-
lem—neither individual has the means to carry a child.‖ Palmer, supra note 
13, at 898 (emphasis added). Lacking ova and a womb to carry the child, the 
only way to conceive a child is through surrogacy arrangements. See Dana, 
supra note 4, at 371–72. Unlike lesbian couples, technology does not currently 
permit both gay partners to have a genetic or physical connection to the child. 
They must either artificially inseminate a traditional surrogate with one part-
ner‘s sperm, or turn to gestational surrogacy, for which the couple obtains do-
nated ova, creates an embryo with one partner‘s sperm, and implants the ferti-
lized egg into a gestational carrier. Cf. Palmer, supra note 13, at 896–97. 
 95. Palmer, supra note 13, at 896. However, one of the partners inde-
pendently can accidentally conceive a child in the event of a heterosexual ex-
tramarital affair. 
 96. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 249. 
 97. See Dana, supra note 4, at 363. 
 98. Biological fallacy aside, the marital presumption should nevertheless 
apply equally to same-sex couples, insofar as one of the presumption‘s purpos-
es is to ―lock in‖ two parents who can assume responsibility for a child. See 
Wasserman, supra note 21, at 289 (―As a normative matter . . . the marital 
presumption of parentage should apply to children born during a same-sex 
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Notwithstanding this fallacy, several states now expand 
the marital presumption to children born into same-sex mar-
riages.99 This represents a positive trend in family law in theo-
ry, for the presumption‘s equal application helps to realize sta-
bility and legitimacy for these family units. However, such 
presumptive parentage, as applied to heterosexual procreative 
parents, in fact yields uncertainty as to the status of the non-
biological intended parent. Indeed, lateral application of the 
marital presumption to same-sex parenthood displays inade-
quacies unique to surrogacy arrangements, necessitating fur-
ther statutory reform to define legal parentage for this arising 
reproductive population.100  
 
marriage. Children of lesbian and gay parents benefit from having two legal 
parents (especially two legal parents who are obligated to provide financial 
support).‖). Indeed, ―even in the face of the ability to determine biological con-
nection to a virtual certainty[,] . . . [w]e do not do genetic testing of every child 
born to a married woman to determine if that child is the biological child of 
her husband, although it would be easy to do so.‖ Polikoff, supra note 91, at 
212. Instead, marriage still holds an esteemed role in parentage determina-
tions. A husband, up to the point of a parentage contest, receives the status of 
presumed legal father by virtue of marriage—and marriage alone—to the 
birth mother. ―The presumption can be challenged by specified parties on spec-
ified grounds, but a husband does not have to prove his fertility and a history 
of sexual intercourse with his wife to show the possibility of biological connec-
tion . . . [in order to] get the presumption . . . .‖ Id. at 216 (emphasis omitted). 
This continued practice intimates that, with regard to legal parentage, mar-
riage retains social weight that has yet to be wholly extinguished by biology. 
Consequently, so far as state-sanctioned same-sex marriages are to be viewed 
in legal parity to longstanding heterosexual marriages, an intended non-
biological parent should similarly receive presumed legal parentage by virtue 
of marriage—and marriage alone—to her or his same-sex partner who will 
serve as the intended biological parent. In fact, marriage often serves as an 
avenue to parenthood for heterosexual couples conceiving through assisted re-
production. ―For a married woman who gives birth to a child conceived using 
an anonymous sperm donor, the law will recognize her husband as the father 
of the child.‖ Palmer, supra note 13, at 907. This should theoretically apply to 
same-sex parents as well. 
 99. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 100. Before publication, this Note originally highlighted another area of 
concern necessitating further statutory reform, cross-jurisdictional recogni-
tion. The U.S. Constitution states that ―Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State.‖ U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1, cl. 1. Because states hold an interest in their 
citizens‘ family units, however, states need not recognize an extraterritorial 
marriage should it directly conflict with local values and customs reflected in 
the state‘s statutes and constitution. See Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith 
and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It’s Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 
313, 334–35 (1997). The then-surviving section of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) codified this public policy exception as federal law: that no state is 
required to recognize same-sex relationships granted by other states in spite of 
the full faith and credit clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). Thus, states needed 
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When compared with artificial insemination, surrogacy 
proves problematic largely due to the visibility of the third par-
ty‘s biological role in the reproduction process. When a woman‘s 
partner (either woman or man) consents to her impregnation 
by a third party‘s sperm, the donor‘s active role ends within se-
conds, rendering the donor ―essentially invisible.‖101 Because 
only the intended parents are present between conception and 
birth, the woman‘s partner more easily receives the presump-
tion. In contrast, when a same-sex couple procreates through 
surrogacy, third-party anonymity is impossible given a surro-
gate‘s active nine-month involvement in the reproduction pro-
cess. A number of states in fact recognize a surrogate mother as 
a legal parent absent a post-birth adoption that transfers par-
entage to another adult.102 As with artificial insemination, the 
 
not ―articulate a sufficiently compelling public policy against recognition of 
same-sex marriages, nor . . . assert a significant interest in the marital status 
of the couple in order to deny recognition of extraterritorial same-sex mar-
riage.‖ Julie L. B. Johnson, The Meaning of “General Laws”: The Extent of 
Congress’s Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitu-
tionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1634 (1997). 
Because not all states recognized same-sex marriage, this ―lack of a court 
judgment . . . render[ed] presumptive parenthood deriving from the status of 
the couple vulnerable to challenge in other jurisdictions.‖ Polikoff, supra note 
91, at 216. As a result, if a married same-sex couple, comprised of one biologi-
cal parent and one presumed parent, moved to a state that did not recognize 
their marriage, there no longer existed a marriage to which the presumption 
of parenthood could attach—effectively revoking any status the non-biological 
parent once held toward the child. To ensure continued presumptive parent-
age of the non-biological partner, a mere presumption, without more, effective-
ly locked same-sex couples to living exclusively in states that will recognize 
their marriage. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 21, at 303 (―When a hetero-
sexual couple marries, the partners . . . strengthen their legal ties to their 
children. It is deeply ironic, then, that when a gay and lesbian couple makes 
the same choice—to marry—DOMA threatens, rather than strengthens, any 
parent-child relationship that derives from the marriage.‖); cf. Palmer, supra 
note 13, at 907 (―[L]egislative restrictions on the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage mean that same-sex couples—even those legally married in a state that 
allows same-sex marriage—cannot rely upon marital presumptions to confer 
parental rights.‖). 
 101. Dana, supra note 4, at 381. 
 102. Pursuant to traditional surrogacy arrangements where the surrogate 
is the child‘s genetic mother, almost all states recognize the surrogate as the 
legal parent; a minority of states also recognize gestational carriers, notwith-
standing no genetic relation, as the legal parent absent a post-birth adoption. 
Interview with June Carbone, supra note 16. But see WIS. STAT. §§ 69.14, 
891.40 (2009) (codifying both a surrogate‘s legal parenthood and a marital pre-
sumption of fatherhood in her husband); Thomas J. Walsh, Viewpoint: Wiscon-
sin’s Undeveloped Surrogacy Law, 85 WIS. LAW. (2012), http://www.wisbar 
.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=85&Issue=
3&ArticleID=2445 (―[A] woman desiring to be a surrogate for a sperm donor 
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law theoretically should recognize a non-biological parent who 
consents to her or his partner contributing genetic material to a 
surrogate based on intent to parent.103 The problem is that 
some jurisdictions are opposed to surrogacy in principle, and 
more are concerned about surrogate exploitation.104 With only 
one of the intended parents and a third party contributing im-
portant biological roles, there is greater hesitance to automati-
cally presume parenthood for the non-biological—albeit intend-
ed—parent: ―[A] third party is always present to assert a 
competing claim of [biological] parentage.‖105 
In spite of the above shortcomings, when a same-sex couple 
chooses to procreate through ART, presumptive parenthood 
should apply to the non-biological intended parent by virtue of 
marriage—as it has for centuries. This lateral application will 
help to realize society‘s desire to channel children into two-
parent families. Nonetheless, presuming parentage will inevi-
tably result in presumption rebuttals at the time of divorce. 
Just as the law struggled with a wave of presumed fathers 
seeking to disestablish parenthood upon the advent of near-
certain paternity testing, there exists a void for how to manage 
non-biological parents seeking to disestablish future 
parenthood vesting through surrogacy arrangements.  
 
and using her own egg may have problems legally separating herself from the 
child. A parentage action would also need to be filed in a situation in which 
the child was fertilized in vitro and the surrogate mother is not biologically 
related to the child.‖). 
 103. Lesbian same-sex couples may need to pursue a surrogacy arrange-
ment for reasons of functional infertility. But the biological reality is that 
whereas many lesbian couples can procreate through artificial insemination, 
not having a womb requires gay same-sex couples to seek a surrogate. Thus, 
while lesbian parents experience difficulties with establishing parentage, the 
law disproportionately impacts gay parents, as they cannot exploit presump-
tion loopholes currently available through artificial insemination. See Apple-
ton, supra note 36, at 264–65. Indeed, due to the surrogate‘s visibility, the law 
has ―never applied the presumption rule to homosexual male couples.‖ Dana, 
supra note 4, at 381. 
 104. See Interview with June Carbone, supra note 16. 
 105. Dana, supra note 4, at 378. Indeed, ―if a married man impregnates a 
woman who is not his wife, the law contains no presumption that overrides the 
biological mother‘s status and presumes the child to be that of the biological 
father‘s wife.‖ Appleton, supra note 36, at 261 (quoting In re Opinion of the 
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004) (Cordy, J., dis-
senting)). 
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B. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION, AS APPLIED TO SURROGACY, 
CREATES AN UNDUE UNCERTAINTY FOR REBUTTING THE  
PRESUMPTION WHILE A CHILD IS IN UTERO 
With the rise of surrogacy, the judicial system experienced 
an unforeseen onslaught of contested parentage cases, wherein 
surrogates sought to trump the parental rights of the child‘s in-
tended parents in an effort to establish their own.106 ―[I]t is a 
sad, but real, possibility that future challenges to the validity 
of . . . parental rights to a child conceived through surrogacy 
will not be brought by the surrogates, but instead, by one 
member of a couple during a separation.‖107 It is likewise a sad, 
but real, possibility that these challenges will occur while the 
child is still in utero.108 Whereas the marital presumption 
should—in theory—apply equally, the presumption of 
parenthood ―does not adequately address the new legal issues 
created by surrogacy,‖109 for there exists a ―lack of statutory 
clarity on when . . . and on what basis the parentage presump-
tion can be rebutted.‖110 
When a woman conceives through heterosexual procreative 
sexual intercourse, the woman who carries the child, by virtue 
of biology, has undisputed genetic relation to her child. Lest 
there be a void between the birth and the assumption of paren-
tal status, the mother becomes her child‘s legal parent. And by 
way of the marital presumption, biological legitimacy, namely 
genetic relation to the husband, is presumed.111 Because pre-
sumed fathers sought to rebut the presumption well before so-
ciety comprehended the dawn of same-sex marriage and assist-
ed reproduction, disestablishment frameworks initially 
 
 106. Most contested cases involve individuals entering private surrogacy 
agreements (especially with relatives and friends), rather than through clinics. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 
1227 (N.J. 1988); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. Dec. 23, 2009). 
 107. Palmer, supra note 13. 
 108. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 
1998). Here, a heterosexual couple contracted for a surrogate, but divorced 
while the child was still in utero. Though the intended mother indicated that 
there were children from the marriage, the intended father maintained that 
he would not be held legally liable for child support on two grounds: (1) that 
the child was not genetically his; and (2) that the child in utero was being ges-
tated by a third party. 
 109. Dana, supra note 4, at 381. 
 110. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 225 (emphasis added). 
 111. See supra notes 22–29 and accompanying text. 
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developed in the realm of traditional procreative sex.112 Under 
these frameworks, the child‘s mother served as the only biologi-
cal constant, and a contested parentage dispute arose with 
courts evaluating claims by one presumed father—and possibly 
one biological father. 
Procreation through surrogacy frustrates this traditional 
framework for rebutting the marital presumption.113 With pro-
creative sex, a presumed parent seeks to disestablish 
parenthood based upon discovered non-paternity.114 Contrarily, 
a presumed non-biological parent knows from the outset that 
she or he will intend to parent and be responsible for a child 
bearing no genetic relation to her or him: biology constitutes a 
known variable from the moment of conception pursuant to a 
surrogacy arrangement.115 ―If such a presumption could be re-
butted by anyone at any time on the basis of lack of biological 
connection between the [parent] and the child, then the pre-
sumption would be meaningless for a [same-sex] couple.‖116 In 
other words, a non-biological parent would always be able to 
disestablish parentage, severing any liability for future sup-
port.117 However, when states extend the marital presumption 
to same-sex parents, frameworks tend not to delineate clearly 
when biology will trump a presumption vesting in the context 
of surrogacy.118 
Furthermore, surrogacy frustrates rebutting the presump-
tion by pushing centuries-old conceptions of biology and moth-
erhood to new limits. A surrogate requires societal reconceptu-
alization of a woman who carries and births a child as not the 
 
 112. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 113. Cf. Appleton, supra note 36, at 261 (noting that ―[a]pplying these con-
cepts to same-sex couples results in some troubling anomalies‖) (quoting In re 
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004) 
(Cordy, J., dissenting)). 
 114. With the ease and accessibility of genetic testing, ―courts and legisla-
tures have moved to allow men to discard their status as fathers‖ when they 
―feel victimized by an obligation to support a child born of their wives‘ infideli-
ty‖ upon discovering their genetic non-paternity. Meyer, supra note 33, at 138. 
 115. This does not apply to gay men who deliberately mix their sperm prior 
to insemination. For purposes of discussion, however, this Note presumes the 
couple has identified which individual will contribute sperm.  
 116. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 248. 
 117. Cf. Meyer, supra note 33, at 137–38 (noting that given the ―ease with 
which genetic parentage can now be determined,‖ genetics are experiencing a 
―resurgence in the law governing ‗disestablishment‘ of paternity‖). 
 118. Cf. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 255 (arguing that states ―need to revisit 
their parentage statutes and make an explicit decision about when biology will 
be permitted to trump the child‘s intact family unit‖). 
DEPRINCE_6fmt 1/3/2016 1:01 PM 
820 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:797 
 
mother of that child.119 Because the surrogate bears the child 
on behalf of the intended parents, she enters into a contract 
specifying that she will not assume the role of mother after the 
child‘s birth.120 In the context of lesbian surrogacy arrange-
ments, this instead requires ―having another woman take on 
that role.‖121 For gay couples, this arrangement ―challenge[s] 
societal norms even further by creating a family where no one 
is the [legal] mother of the child.‖122 Thus, when a non-
biological intended parent seeks to rebut the presumption and 
disestablish parenthood, the formula changes. There are in-
stead three parties, comprised of either: two intended moth-
ers—one biological and one non-biological—and a birth mother; 
or, two intended fathers—one biological and one non-
biological—and a birth mother.  
Whereas frameworks to rebut the presumption and dises-
tablish parenthood evolved in the context of heterosexual pro-
creation, same-sex marriage and procreation through surrogacy 
inherently challenges the underlying traditional and societal 
conceptions of biology and motherhood. Should a non-biological 
intended parent seek to disestablish parenthood before a child 
is born to a surrogate, the parties must rely on a court‘s deter-
mination—employing current presumption and disestablish-
ment frameworks—absent a state statute addressing surroga-
cy. Most states, however, remain ―simply silent on parentage 
determinations in situations involving surrogacy arrange-
ments.‖123 As a result, there is an ―unacceptable level of uncer-
tainty‖124 around how such challenges will be resolved, necessi-
tating reconceptualization of how to define legal parentage 
stemming from surrogacy. 
 
 119. See Palmer, supra note 13, at 899. 
 120. See id. at 902. 
 121. Id. at 899–900 (emphasis added) (noting further that society prefers 
this outcome to gay male surrogacy arrangements, for at least ―someone is the 
mother of the child‖). 
 122. Id.; see also Dana, supra note 4, at 363, 377 (―If the intended parents 
are homosexual, this only compounds the difficulty of determining parentage 
because having two fathers conflicts with traditional notions of family for-
mation . . . . Without another woman to step in to be the child‘s mother, a sur-
rogate will not be viewed as a ‗surrogate uterus; she [will be] the mother.‘‖). 
 123. Dana, supra note 4, at 369. 
 124. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 225–26. 
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C. SCHOLARS AND COURTS ALIKE ADVOCATE FOR REFRAMING  
MODERN PARENTAGE DOCTRINE 
Traditional conceptions of family law as they have existed 
for centuries do not translate into a society experiencing same-
sex marriage and parenthood through surrogacy. Family law 
scholars argue that with most courts making parentage deci-
sions based on marriage and biology, the continued use of the 
marital presumption for same-sex parents—especially in con-
tested surrogacy agreements—will fail to realize and protect 
children‘s best interests.125 As explained by June Carbone and 
Naomi Cahn: 
With the changing conceptions of the family, we must face the issue of 
how society ensures children‘s well-being, and whether we should 
continue to police family structure or become more willing to focus at-
tention on children‘s individual needs . . . .  
  . . . . 
  . . . The issue for children therefore is to determine what set of re-
lationships between the adults is most likely to promote children‘s 
well-being and how to encourage those relationships in a modern so-
ciety.126 
Indeed, the law ―cannot protect all children from aban-
donment and conflict created by their parents, biological or so-
cial.‖127 But given ―current legal chaos and uncertainty‖128 sur-
rounding parentage determinations through existing 
frameworks, children conceived by same-sex parents through 
surrogacy arrangements are placed in unduly precarious cir-
cumstances from the moment of conception.129 Before the 
child‘s birth, both the accountability between the biological in-
tended parent and the non-biological intended parent, and the 
legal status of the non-biological parent toward her or his fu-
ture child, are equivocally defined. 
Absent any clear social consensus on the indispensable de-
terminants of parenthood,130 legislation and jurisprudence 
 
 125. See Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1011, 1039. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Glennon, supra note 2, at 587. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 294 (noting how the status quo often un-
reasonably places ―the sanctity of the marital presumption before the best in-
terests of the child‖). 
 130. Instead of explaining why one is—or is not—positioned to fill a paren-
tal role, parentage determinations today rely on ―unspoken assumptions re-
garding how parental status is generated . . . ‗implicitly appeal[ing] to some 
preanalytic concept of parenthood.‘‖ Purvis, supra note 92, at 651 (quoting Da-
ra E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 210, 360 (2012)). 
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must advance new benchmarks for what constitutes a legal 
parent who will be responsible for a child‘s well-being.131 
1. Moving Toward Intent-Based Parentage Determinations 
When sex, marriage, and reproduction are effectively dis-
sociated—and when parents can reproduce outside traditional 
procreative intercourse—neither marriage nor biological rela-
tion to a child are guaranteed variables upon a child‘s birth. 
For enhanced certainty behind parentage determinations in a 
rapidly evolving family law era, scholars assert that legal par-
entage should be based not on a presumption or biology, but on 
the more meaningful measure of one‘s established parenting in-
tention.132  
Such a benchmark aids same-sex intended parents who 
elect to procreate through surrogacy.133 The marital presump-
tion and current disestablishment frameworks both center on 
marriage and biology. In contrast, intent-based evaluations 
make parentage independent from ―a state‘s view of same-sex 
relationships‖134 and ―place[] diminished importance on genetic 
or biological connection.‖135 Should a non-biological intended 
parent seek to avoid legal obligation toward a future child, in-
tent-based parentage circumvents judicial determinations of 
presuming and rebutting parenthood under traditional frame-
works. Instead, the two parties who intend to parent the child 
at its birth are more readily identified as the future child‘s le-
gal parents, regardless of their marital relation to each other or 
their genetic relation to the child.136  
This also helps to realize the best interests of the child con-
 
 131. See Meyer, supra note 33, at 136; see also Purvis, supra note 92, at 
645 (―[W]hy does a biological relationship generate parental rights?‖). But see 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 271 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting 
the notion that biological connection between parent and child is ―unimportant 
in determining the nature of liberty interests‖). 
 132. See Jacobs, supra note 61, at 291; see also Which Ties Bind?, supra 
note 1, at 1047 (questioning to what extent a child‘s relationship with a parent 
depends on a parent‘s relationship to her or his other parent). 
 133. ―A pure intent test is the only available method for courts to deter-
mine parentage without gender, marital, or sexual orientation biases affecting 
the outcome.‖ Dana, supra note 4, at 358. Conversely, accidental pregnancies 
frustrate intent-based standards, as there may be no intent to become a par-
ent. This Note presumes surrogacy arrangements do not yield accidental 
pregnancies. 
 134. Lynda Wray Black, The Birth of a Parent: Defining Parentage for 
Lenders of Genetic Material, 92 NEB. L. REV. 799, 837 (2014). 
 135. Meyer, supra note 33, at 136. 
 136. See Black, supra note 134. 
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ceived through surrogacy, even while in utero.137 An intent-
based inquiry reinforces parental status prior to birth based on 
―significant actions being undertaken by either party‖: in the 
context of a surrogacy arrangement, the deliberate fertilization 
of an egg to create a life.138 In the event that a non-biological 
intended parent does not want to hold the child out as her or 
his own prior to its birth, an intent-based inquiry will identify 
the parent as a presumed legal parent to be held financially re-
sponsible,139 notwithstanding a divorce from the biological in-
tended parent, or want of biological relation.140 
2. Establishing Parentage Through Theories of Labor 
Similarly related to an intent-based theory of parenthood, 
other reform proponents view parentage not as a ―product of bi-
ology or a natural inheritance,‖ but instead ―understood as the 
product of a Lockean labor interest.‖141 This underlying consid-
eration confers parentage status through ―investing labor and 
money into a resource . . . thus generating a claim to that re-
source.‖142  
Such a theory proves especially applicable to surrogacy ar-
rangements. Procreation through the use of a surrogate is time-
consuming and requires a ―significant financial and emotional 
investment.‖143 But for the labor and investment of the intend-
 
 137. An intent-based determination also helps to protect gestational surro-
gates. A gestational mother—entering into an arrangement anticipating not to 
be responsible for the child upon its birth—should not be held responsible 
should the intended parents seek to renege on their responsibilities toward the 
child. 
 138. Dana, supra note 4, at 383. 
 139. ―Once the status of legal parent is recognized, it is a profoundly power-
ful position.‖ Purvis, supra note 92, at 649; see Dana, supra note 4, at 383 (jus-
tifying this outcome through the ―states‘ interest in having all children be fi-
nancially supported‖).  
 140. This is not to suggest, however, that presumed parental status be-
comes ironclad in such instances. For example, a contract or consent form can 
serve as a clear indication of intent, rebuttable upon a showing of fraud, du-
ress, misrepresentation, or incapacity. 
 141. Purvis, supra note 92, at 654. See generally E. Gary Spitko, The Con-
stitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother’s 
Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
97 (2006) (arguing a father‘s biological connection to a child is constitutionally 
significant because it provides evidence that the biological mother consented 
to the father‘s relationship with the child). 
 142. Purvis, supra note 92, at 655. 
 143. Dana, supra note 4, at 382. Between legal fees, medical procedure ex-
penses, and surrogate compensation, the process can easily cost $100,000. See 
id. at 363. 
DEPRINCE_6fmt 1/3/2016 1:01 PM 
824 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:797 
 
ed parents, the child would not exist.144 One can tangibly 
measure pre-birth labor through preparations undertaken 
when expecting a future child. This can include signing a sur-
rogacy contract, attending fertilization appointments, request-
ing future work accommodations, enrolling in parenting clas-
ses, readying a nursery, et cetera.145 Labor-based parentage 
determinations thus serve a concrete standard that ―operation-
alizes [the objectives of] intent as a parentage rule.‖146 
Because labor-based understandings can be employed ―re-
gardless of the sexual orientation of the parents . . . [whether] 
married or not,‖147 a labor benchmark, as applied to same-sex 
procreative parents, yields similar outcomes to intent-based 
considerations.148 In effect, a gestational carrier serves as the 
initial legal parent, the biological intended parent becomes the 
second legal parent, and the non-biological intended parent be-
comes a parent with the transfer of rights from the surrogate 
after birth. An equitable estoppel, based on the non-biological 
parent‘s labor in engineering the birth, would estop the non-
biological parent from denying parentage at the point where 
the surrogate disclaims maternity, notwithstanding an attempt 
of pre-birth disestablishment or divorce. 
3. Judicial Calls for Legislative Action 
Same-sex couples today can ―proudly form families that 
would have been both legally and socially unthinkable in an 
earlier era.‖149 In response to such modern family law develop-
ments, intent-based and labor-based parentage theories repre-
sent important stepping stones for the reconceptualization of 
what it now means to be a parent. However, because legal par-
entage is a matter of law by definition,150 such theories alone do 
not suffice to resolve unprecedented parentage issues surround-
ing surrogacy. 
Under current legal frameworks, procreative same-sex 
couples ―have little, if any, opportunity to establish legal par-
entage early on for both parents.‖151 Absent such early legal 
 
 144. See id. at 382–83. 
 145. See Purvis, supra note 92, at 681. 
 146. Id. at 680. 
 147. Id. at 687. 
 148. See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text. 
 149. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 212. 
 150. Id. at 207. 
 151. Parness & Townsend, supra note 83, at 614.  
DEPRINCE_6fmt 1/3/2016 1:01 PM 
2015] RECONCEPTUALIZING PARENTHOOD 825 
 
sanction, many families headed by same-sex parents will thrive 
nevertheless. In the event of a parentage dispute, however, 
parties will need to rely on court determinations, as the majori-
ty of states fail to statutorily define legal parentage through 
surrogacy.152 But even though surrogacy and same-sex parent-
age do not fit existing doctrine, courts nonetheless hesitate to 
redefine legal parentage absent legislative action.153 The pre-
sent system instead observes judges ―clutching at overly rigid 
approaches to determining parentage . . . that do not allow for 
the full range of human procreative and parental conduct.‖154  
Thus, a new basis to define legal parentage when same-sex 
couples procreate through surrogacy is necessary.155 This re-
quires not only social reconceptualization,156 but also legislative 
action toward statutory clarification.157  
III.  PROPOSALS FOR ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY 
SCHEMA   
Family law is at a new crossroads. Traditional conceptions 
of marriage, reproduction, and parenthood were challenged 
with rapid social and technological revolution in the latter-
twentieth century—resulting in jurisprudence struggling with 
how to disestablish paternity in light of a weakening marital 
presumption.158 Today‘s twenty-first-century crossroad stems 
from a modern era wherein individuals of the same sex can 
marry, divorce, and reproduce biologically. Understandings of 
parentage must be reconceptualized once more so as to be rec-
onciled with marriage equality and assisted reproductive tech-
nology. Surrogacy can serve as a keystone to pioneer family law 
 
 152. See Dana, supra note 4, at 369. 
 153. See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 736 (Tenn. 2005) (―We, as interpret-
ers of the law, not makers of the law, are powerless . . . to reach a different 
resolution.‖); see also In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 
(Ct. App. 1998) (―[W]e must call on the Legislature to sort out the parental 
rights and responsibilities of those involved in artificial reproduction.‖). 
 154. Wald, supra note 33, at 410. 
 155. See Polikoff, supra note 91, at 235 (noting the ―dramatic increase in 
the use of ART‖ necessitates clarifying ―the parentage of all of the children 
born as a result of modern science‖ (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, cmt. 
(UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2002))). 
 156. See supra notes 132–46 and accompanying text. 
 157. See In re Adoption of Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 37 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(urging the legislature to act expeditiously); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 
767 n.3 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (asking the legislature to act and end the un-
certainties of surrogacy). 
 158. See supra notes 30–46 and accompanying text. 
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away from its seventeenth century common law vestiges, and 
into a technological era wherein the prototypical traditional 
family unit, although expected in theory, indeed proves excep-
tional in fact.159  
Under the status quo, rigid application of existing frame-
works means that same-sex parents who dissolve their rela-
tionship consequently will ―often leave their children without 
legal ties‖ to both intended parents.160 In response, this Part 
proposes two model statutory frameworks that will better de-
fine the legal roles and responsibilities—both pre-conception 
and pre-birth—of intended parents and surrogates alike. Sec-
tion A explores the necessary considerations underlying statu-
tory reform. Section B next recommends two model statutes 
upon which states can frame surrogacy laws: one that transfers 
parental rights to intended parents pre-conception; and an al-
ternative that, based on pre-birth intent and labor, transfers 
rights to intended parents post-birth. Lastly, Section C weighs 
the benefits and critiques of each. 
A. CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING STATUTORY REFORM 
Prevailing theories of parentage often fail to identify the 
origins of parenthood, instead hinging the right to parent on 
marital status or biology.161 For same-sex parents procreating 
by way of surrogacy, parenthood should not and cannot vest 
through these benchmarks.162 Surrogacy entails calculated and 
concerted efforts to conceive a child—a child that may not share 
genetic relation to one of her or his future intended parents. 
And in the context of same-sex intended parents, this further 
breaks from archetypal mother-father duality. Thus, surrogacy 
obliges reexamining issues of marriage, biology, and parental 
intentionality.163  
 
 159. ―In an era of readily available divorce and DNA testing, we need to 
reexamine the policies likely to promote permanent ties . . . .‖ Which Ties 
Bind?, supra note 1, at 1012. 
 160. Parness & Townsend, supra note 83, at 614. 
 161. Cf. Purvis, supra note 92, at 645 (―[T]he law has shifted over time, 
from favoring a property right based in genetics to a Lockean theory of proper-
ty rights earned through labor.‖). 
 162. See supra Part II.A–.B. 
 163. Cf. Wald, supra note 33, at 383 (explaining further that surrogacy 
―calls into question the value we place on genetics in assigning parental 
rights‖). 
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1. What Makes a Person a Parent? 
In statutorily defining parenthood through surrogacy, leg-
islatures must keep ―the question whether a child was born in-
to a marriage‖ separate from ―whether that child has two par-
ents.‖164 After all, marriage historically constituted a proxy for 
presumed biology. In the context of same-sex parents who plan 
to conceive a child together through surrogacy, however, mar-
riage cannot serve as a proxy for biology due to innate struc-
tural infertility. Marriage instead would seem ―a proxy for con-
sent of the definite legal parent—the biological [intended 
parent]—to share parental rights‖ with the non-biological in-
tended parent.165  
If the actual underlying consideration is consent to parent, 
legislatures should draft statutory language that does not uti-
lize marriage as the mechanism to confer parenthood to a non-
biological intended parent.166 Instead, surrogacy statutes 
should attach parental rights to a non-biological parent based 
exclusively on measures that capture her or his consent to par-
ent the future child. 
2. What Triggers Severing a Surrogate‘s Parental Status? 
Surrogacy proves problematic due to an additional third 
party fulfilling an indispensable biological role in the reproduc-
tion process. In other words, ―a third party is always present to 
assert a competing claim of parentage.‖167 Thus, a statute that 
confers parental status to a non-biological intended parent 
must simultaneously address what rights and responsibili-
ties—if any—will vest in a surrogate who carries the child to 
term. Due to constitutional concerns, however, legislatures may 
not treat traditional and gestational surrogacy as existing in 
parity.168 
a. Statutes Addressing Traditional Surrogacy 
When a same-sex couple procreates through traditional 
 
 164. Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Mari-
tal Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 671, 
720 (2012); see also Which Ties Bind?, supra note 1, at 1047 (noting that mar-
riage should not continue as the primary vehicle for establishing parent-child 
relationships). 
 165. Grossman, supra note 164, at 718. 
 166. Cf. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 212 (―[O]nce marriage does not deter-
mine parental rights and responsibilities, the law must decide what does.‖). 
 167. Dana, supra note 4, at 378.  
 168. See supra note 94 for further definition around this distinction. 
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surrogacy, a statute cannot automatically strip a surrogate‘s 
parentage rights and vest them in a non-biological intended 
parent. Traditional surrogates utilize their own ova in the re-
production process, creating a biological link between the sur-
rogate and the future child. And the Constitution recognizes a 
fundamental interest in the companionship of one‘s natural 
child.169 While entering the agreement knowing she bears the 
child on behalf of its intended parents, a surrogate very well 
may deem herself unable to part with her child at the time of 
birth.170 Accordingly, a statutory provision divesting a biologi-
cal mother of legal parentage of a child at its birth may be 
deemed unconstitutional.171 A non-biological intended parent‘s 
legal status instead must be conferred through an adoption on-
ly after a traditional surrogate‘s rights are severed.172 
b. Statutes Addressing Gestational Surrogacy 
In contrast, a statute addressing gestational surrogacy can 
strip a surrogate‘s parentage rights and vest them in a non-
biological intended parent from the moment of birth or be-
fore.173 Unlike traditional surrogates, gestational surrogates do 
not utilize their own ova in the production process. The funda-
mental interest in the companionship of a natural child, recog-
nized in traditional surrogacy, arguably diminishes in gesta-
 
 169. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IX, XIV, § 1; see also Wilke v. Culp, 483 
A.2d 420, 425 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1984) (―It has . . . been held that a 
parent‘s right to the care and companionship of his or her child are so funda-
mental as to be guaranteed protection under the . . . Constitution.‖). This right 
is not absolute, however. The State may infringe upon a legal parent‘s right to 
custody and control over a child if the parent endangers the health or safety of 
the child. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000). But absent a show-
ing of unfitness, abandonment, or gross misconduct, there is no reason to in-
terfere with a parent‘s constitutional prerogatives. Id. at 549.  
 170. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988). 
 171. Only Virginia‘s surrogacy statute allows traditional surrogates to sev-
er parental rights through a contract pre-authorized by the court, while re-
serving for the surrogate a 180-day contract termination period. See VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165. Because this statute has not been used or tested in 
court, its constitutionality is unresolved. Absent a contrary statute, however, 
states will view the traditional surrogate as the legal parent, and little senti-
ment exists for changing this result. See Interview with June Carbone, supra 
note 16; cf. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1242.  
 172. See Dana, supra note 4, at 365 (analogizing a traditional surrogacy 
agreement to an adoption). In pursuit of uniformity, however, legislatures can 
promulgate one statute for traditional and gestational surrogacy, both held to 
the higher constitutional threshold potentially required for the former.  
 173. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2002). 
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tional surrogacy.174 With no genetic link existing between the 
gestational carrier and the future child, the surrogate ―is ‗not 
exercising her own right to make procreative choices; she is 
agreeing to provide a necessary and profoundly important ser-
vice‘ to parents who ‗intended to procreate a child genetically 
related to them by the only available means.‘‖175 Thus, a legis-
lature can constitutionally promulgate statutes wherein legal 
parent status never bestows in a gestational surrogate.  
3. How To Create a Portable Set of Parentage Rights 
Intended same-sex parents cannot rely exclusively on the 
marital presumption to confer legal parenthood through surro-
gacy.176 Legislatures must instead enact statutory provisions 
that clarify legal parentage during early stages of a surrogacy 
agreement, so as to effectively create more concrete rights and 
responsibilities in non-biological intended parents—regardless 
of marital status upon a child‘s birth. Furthermore, the legal 
recognition bestowed through surrogacy must simultaneously 
be enforceable across jurisdictions. Such outcomes are achieva-
ble by way of birth certificate recognition. 
Birth certificates constitute the official legal record evi-
dencing a child‘s parentage.177 For a child born through surro-
gacy, the biological intended parent would appear on the birth 
certificate. However, competing claims for the birth certificate‘s 
remaining blank space exist between the non-biological intend-
ed parent and the surrogate. In the event of traditional surro-
gacy, the birth mother does not intend to serve as a child‘s legal 
parent; and in the event of gestational surrogacy, not only does 
the gestational carrier not intend to serve as a child‘s legal par-
ent, but no genetic link exists between the surrogate and the 
 
 174. Some may disagree with this assertion, arguing that gestation would 
confer parental rights on the basis of nature by definition. This Note, however, 
advocates for a diminished parental right absent a genetic link. ―The argu-
ment that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and 
deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for 
centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights.‖ See Dana, 
supra note 4, at 368. 
 175. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993)). 
 176. See supra Part II.A.  
 177. Birth certificates do not establish legal parentage, but instead dictate 
parentage in the state of issue. Because parents‘ names are entered onto a 
birth certificate by virtue of marriage, states that did not recognize same-sex 
marriage before Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), were not re-
quired to recognize the birth certificate either. See Polikoff, supra note 91, at 
238–39. 
DEPRINCE_6fmt 1/3/2016 1:01 PM 
830 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:797 
 
future child. Because gestational carriers often regard intended 
parents as parents,178 the stronger claim arguably rests with 
the non-biological parent who intended to parent the child from 
the moment of conception.179 But the underlying problem re-
mains that ―parentage statutes that remain gender-specific, 
with one individual identified as mother and the other identi-
fied as father, simply do not contemplate or accommodate par-
entage by same-sex couples.‖180 
Reform thus requires reconceptualizing birth certificates 
as reflecting a child‘s intended parentage instead of biological 
parentage.181 Placing a non-biological intended parent on the 
birth certificate will minimize the opportunity and success of 
disestablishing parentage of a child conceived and birthed 
through surrogacy.182  
B. PROPOSED MODEL SURROGACY STATUTES 
Acknowledging that not all states will permit gestational 
surrogacy,183 whereas others will not permit traditional surro-
gacy,184 this Note proposes two distinct solutions—one intended 
expressly for gestational surrogacy arrangements, and another 
that states can tailor for purposes of either traditional or gesta-
 
 178. See What Motivates Gestational Carriers?, RESOLVE: NAT‘L INFERTILI-
TY ASS‘N (2015), http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/surrogacy/ 
what-motivates-gestational-carriers.html. See generally Todd D. Pizitz et al., 
Do Women Who Choose To Become Surrogate Mothers Have Different Psycho-
logical Profiles Compared to a Normative Female Sample?, 26 WOMEN BIRTH 
15 (2013) (noting that surrogate mothers are both resilient and aware of the 
importance of emotional boundary setting during the surrogacy process). 
 179. See generally D.C. CODE §§ 7-205(e)(3), 16-909(e) (2015); Civil Code of 
Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 538–39 (Can.); cf. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 239. 
 180. Black, supra note 134, at 808. 
 181. This will require cooperation of state divisions of vital records to modi-
fy birth certificates to list parents as ―parents‖ rather than ―mother‖ and ―fa-
ther.‖ See id. at 841. 
 182. A birth certificate, while ―not definitive proof‖ of parentage, ―is the one 
piece of commonly accepted evidence.‖ Polikoff, supra note 91, at 238–39. 
Thus, intended parents can simultaneously obtain a parentage judgment to 
bolster the birth certificate‘s strength and to ensure recognition of a non-
biological intended parent‘s rights. NAT‘L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL 
RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES (2015), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf; cf. Parness & 
Townsend, supra note 83, at 607 (noting that such acknowledgments make 
disestablishment more difficult). 
 183. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2011); D.C. CODE §§ 16-401, -402 
(2009); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2010). 
 184. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-
05, 08 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (2008). 
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tional surrogacy. Thus, to effectuate the aforementioned con-
siderations underlying statutory reform despite inevitable 
state-by-state variation, this Section proposes two model stat-
utes upon which states can frame surrogacy laws: one that 
transfers parental rights to intended parents pre-conception; 
and an alternative that transfers rights to intended parents 
post-birth.  
1. Pre-Conception Birth Order Statute 
To ensure that a non-biological intended parent cannot 
disestablish parentage while the child remains in utero, this 
statutory framework suggests requiring a pre-conception par-
entage order for gestational surrogacy arrangements. A pre-
conception order would confer legal parent status to the two in-
tended parents and would occur before a medical professional 
implants a viable embryo in the surrogate for gestation.185 
Thus, from the point the surrogate begins her active role in the 
reproduction process, the future child will not be viewed as the 
child of the gestational carrier, but instead the intended par-
ents.186 And, upon the child‘s birth, the intended parents identi-
fied on the pre-conception order will be placed on the birth cer-
tificate.187 In the context of same-sex intended parents, this 
signifies that both the biological parent and non-biological par-
ent will be recognized at the child‘s birth notwithstanding mar-
ital status or biology. 
 
 
 
 
PROPOSED STATUTE 
Subdivision 1. Pre-Conception Parentage Order. 
 
 185. Cf. Polikoff, supra note 91, at 249–50 (―[B]oth . . . know from the mo-
ment of pregnancy that [one] partner is not the child‘s biological parent. The 
decisions the two [intended parents] make at that point have consequences for 
the child and should have legal consequences.‖). 
 186. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2002). ―Because 
the mother‘s gestational labor has not yet begun, she does not have a greater 
claim to the status of parent and the attendant decisionmaking [sic] abilities.‖ 
Purvis, supra note 92, at 668. 
 187. ―[T]he law must recognize as parent any individual (regardless of gen-
der, sexual orientation, or marital status) who is biologically related to a 
child.‖ Black, supra note 134, at 812–13. Thus, such a statute cannot apply to 
traditional surrogacy. Instead, a non-biological intended parent can only be 
recognized through a second-parent adoption proceeding upon the surrogate‘s 
voluntary waiver of parentage. 
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a) Any person who intends to parent a child born through 
gestational surrogacy must sign a pre-conception parentage 
order (order) prior to a surrogate‘s gestation of a fertilized 
ovum or ova. 
1)  At least one person, and no more than two persons, shall 
be identified on the order as intending to parent the fu-
ture child. 
A) If one person is identified on the order, that person 
shall be recognized as the future child‘s parent. 
B) If two persons are identified on the order, those per-
sons shall be recognized as the future child‘s par-
ents. 
2)  The gestational surrogate shall sign the order, indicat-
ing her understanding that she will not be recognized as 
the future child‘s parent. 
b) The order shall be enforceable, notwithstanding: 
1)  marital status of the person(s) identified on the order; 
2)  genetic relation between the person(s) identified on the 
order and the future child; 
3)  sex of the person(s) identified on the order. 
Subdivision 2. Recognition of Parents at Birth. 
a) After the child‘s birth, the person(s) identified on the order 
shall appear on the child‘s birth certificate, notwithstand-
ing: 
1)  marital status of the person(s) identified on the order; 
2)  genetic relation between the person(s) identified on the 
order and the child; 
3)  sex of the person(s) identified on the order. 
b) The gestational surrogate shall not appear on the child‘s 
birth certificate. 
2. Intent/Labor-Based Parentage Statute 
A legislature may be uncomfortable with divesting a gesta-
tional surrogate of any parentage rights to a future child prior 
to the commencement of her gestational role.188 Thus, statutory 
provisions can analogize surrogacy to a quasi-adoption ar-
rangement, recognizing a surrogate—either traditional or ges-
tational—as the legal mother before and at the child‘s birth. 
While such a framework offers surrogates an enhanced role 
relative to the pre-conception parentage order statute, intent-
based and labor-based considerations can protect the intended 
 
 188. See supra Part II.B. 
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parents‘ indispensable role in the reproduction process. And 
further, safeguards can be codified to ensure that a non-
intended biological parent cannot move to disestablish 
parenthood while the child is in utero, despite the surrogate‘s 
recognition as the legal mother.  
 
PROPOSED STATUTE 
Subdivision 1. Pre-Birth Parentage Order. 
a) Any person who intends to parent a child born through 
traditional or gestational surrogacy must sign a pre-birth 
parentage order (order) after a surrogate‘s post-conception 
gestation of a fertilized ovum or ova begins, but prior to the 
child‘s birth. 
1)  At least one person, and no more than two persons, shall 
be identified on the order as intending to parent the fu-
ture child. 
A) If one person is identified on the order, that person 
shall be recognized as the future child‘s parent. 
B) If two persons are identified on the order, those per-
sons shall be recognized as the future child‘s par-
ents. 
2)  The surrogate shall be recognized as the future child‘s 
legal mother during gestation. 
b) The order shall be enforceable, notwithstanding: 
1)  marital status of the person(s) identified on the order; 
2)  genetic relation between the person(s) identified on the 
order and the future child; 
3)  sex of the person(s) identified on the order. 
Subdivision 2. Recognition of Parents at Birth. 
a) After the child‘s birth, the surrogate—traditional or gesta-
tional—and any person identified on the order who shares 
genetic relation with the child shall be recognized as the 
child‘s parents. 
b) Traditional Surrogacy. The surrogate shall have up to 72 
hours after the child‘s birth to seek recognition as the 
child‘s legal parent.189 
 
 189. Such a time frame may appear unduly unequivocal. The time frame 
provision, however, draws heavily from current adoption statutes. For exam-
ple, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia statutorily specify ―when a 
birth parent may execute consent to adoption.‖ CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATE-
WAY, CONSENT TO ADOPTION 4 (2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/ 
consent.pdf. Thirty-one states require a post-birth waiting period, ―[t]he most 
common waiting period . . . [being] 72 hours.‖ Id. 
DEPRINCE_6fmt 1/3/2016 1:01 PM 
834 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:797 
 
1)  The surrogate will automatically receive recognition as a 
legal parent. 
2)  If the surrogate fails to act within 72 hours after the 
child‘s birth, the person(s) identified on the order shall 
appear on the child‘s birth certificate, notwithstanding: 
A) marital status of the person(s) identified on the or-
der; 
B) genetic relation between the person(s) identified on 
the order and the child; 
C) sex of the person(s) identified on the order. 
c) Gestational Surrogacy. The surrogate shall have up to 72 
hours after the child‘s birth to seek recognition as the 
child‘s legal parent. 
1)  A gestational surrogate will not automatically receive 
recognition as a legal parent. The court shall weigh the 
surrogate‘s parentage claim against that of the per-
son(s) identified on the order. 
A) Any person(s) identified on the order shall receive 
recognition by way of: 
(i) intent to parent; 
(ii) time, money, and labor invested in executing the 
surrogacy agreement; 
(iii) the child‘s best interests; 
(iv) other equitable factors. 
B) A gestational surrogate will only be recognized if the 
court deems such recognition in the child‘s best in-
terests. 
2)  If the surrogate fails to act within 72 hours after the 
child‘s birth, the person(s) identified on the order shall 
appear on the child‘s birth certificate, notwithstanding: 
A) marital status of the person(s) identified on the or-
der; 
B) genetic relation between the person(s) identified on 
the order and the child; 
C) sex of the person(s) identified on the order. 
 
C. WEIGHING THE OPTIONS 
Each of the above statutes has respective strengths and 
weaknesses, with both resulting in positive and negative con-
sequences around surrogacy arrangements. After weighing and 
critiquing both models, each state will need to decide which op-
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tion best matches the needs, and socioeconomic and political 
composition, of its constituency. 
At least in the realm of gestational surrogacy, the pre-
conception birth order statute displays the opportunity for the 
clearest and most consistent outcomes: the future child will not 
be viewed as the child of the gestational carrier, but instead of 
the intended parents. Due to constitutional concerns,190 such 
certainty cannot attach to traditional surrogacy arrangements; 
as a result, same-sex parents, choosing to procreate through 
this avenue, must rely on comparatively more-uncertain pre-
birth parentage orders or traditional adoptions. Statutorily cod-
ifying such a disparity, however, can be justified as simply fol-
lowing trends in surrogacy arrangements. Indeed, ―ninety-five 
percent of surrogacy arrangements in the United States are 
gestational.‖191 As a result, implementing statutes requiring a 
pre-conception parentage order would create certainty in legal 
parenthood for almost all surrogacy arrangements. 
Though such certainty appears attractive, the corollary is 
that such statutes may incentivize individuals to pursue gesta-
tional surrogacy when they would otherwise prefer traditional 
surrogacy arrangements—the ultimate effect being the herding 
of collective procreative decision-making in the LGBT commu-
nity. Furthermore, preference aside, such incentivization to-
ward gestational surrogacy may price future parents out of the 
option. From conception to birth, the average gestational surro-
gacy costs approximately $100,000, after taking legal fees, med-
ical procedure expenses, and surrogate compensation into ac-
count.192 Individuals desiring the statutory certainties of 
gestational surrogacy may be unable to afford this avenue, forc-
ing them either to pursue a traditional surrogacy arrangement 
or to leave the surrogacy market altogether. 
Surrogacy also poses quandaries amongst select de-
mographics throughout the United States, with opponents se-
verely opposed to its practice on ethical grounds.193 Based on 
 
 190. See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
 191. Dana, supra note 4, at 363. 
 192. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 193. See generally Rosalie Ber, Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy, 21 
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 153 (2000) (arguing that gestational surro-
gacy is a form of prostitution and slavery as well as an exploitation of the 
poor); Jennifer Lahl & Christopher White, Why Gestational Surrogacy Is 
Wrong, NAT‘L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
article/375364/why-gestational-surrogacy-wrong-jennifer-lahl-christopher 
-white (arguing that there are medical and moral consequences of paying 
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the demographic composition of a given state, legislatures may 
feel inherent discomfort with advocating for pre-conception 
parentage orders. Wholly divesting gestational surrogates of 
any parentage rights before her gestational role begins would 
certainly meet political backlash in states where surrogacy is 
already ethically suspect. In response, pre-birth parentage or-
ders effectively make surrogacy appear more akin to a quasi-
adoption process, which can have the effect of increased institu-
tional support for—or alternatively, reduced inherent discom-
fort with—surrogacy. While this provides less certainty than 
the pre-conception corollary, it can achieve overall enhanced le-
gal certainty in defining parenthood, as compared to surrogacy 
arrangements pursued absent statutory safeguards.  
Unlike the pre-conception parentage order statute, this ap-
proach does not implicate constitutional concerns around tradi-
tional surrogacy, as it does not entail divesting parentage 
rights in a surrogate pre-birth. This results in a policy tradeoff. 
Though pre-birth parentage orders offer less certainty than 
pre-conception parentage orders, it permits a more equal level 
of protection between traditional and gestational surrogacy 
agreements. As a result, couples that prefer traditional surro-
gacy for personal and economic reasons are afforded more uni-
form parentage safeguards, instead of being herded toward ges-
tational surrogacy or forced to exit the surrogacy market. 
It will be for each state to decide ultimately which model 
framework will best fit its needs and the needs of its constitu-
ency. In so electing, states must keep in mind the fundamental 
problem underlying reform: existing frameworks do not cur-
rently guarantee that children born to same-sex parents will 
maintain legal ties to both intended parents upon dissolution of 
the relationship. To the extent that there remains a generalized 
preference for children having two parents, either of these 
statutes will help to effectuate and realize that goal. 
  CONCLUSION   
Parenthood was once easily determined: when a married 
couple conceived of a child through sexual reproduction, the 
mother and her husband were legally bound as parents. The 
deviation from the historic unification of sex, reproduction, and 
marriage during the late-twentieth century, however, intro-
duced inherent uncertainty of what it means to be a parent. 
 
women to gestate babies and that women and children are exposed to exploita-
tion). 
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This collapse of the prototypical traditional family unit necessi-
tated revisualization of centuries-old common law. Today, so-
cial perceptions around parenthood are now challenged once 
more by way of same-sex couples not only receiving legal mari-
tal recognition, but also the capacity to reproduce biologically 
through assisted reproductive means. Yet, intended same-sex 
parents cannot rely exclusively on the current frameworks to 
confer legal parenthood through surrogacy. 
With family law arriving at a new crossroads, a new basis 
to define legal parentage when same-sex couples procreate 
through surrogacy is necessary. Such redefinition requires not 
just social reconceptualization, but legislative action toward 
statutory clarification. This Note posits two model frameworks 
for states to adopt and tailor: one requiring a pre-conception 
parentage order, and the other requiring a pre-birth parentage 
order. These statutory frameworks will not only create a porta-
ble set of cross-jurisdictional parentage rights, but will also bet-
ter define what makes a person a parent as well as what trig-
gers severing a surrogate‘s parental status. To the extent that a 
generalized preference exists for children being raised with the 
support of two parents, such statutory proposals will help 
achieve a child‘s best interests regardless of the sex or marital 
status of her or his parents when she or he is born. 
 
